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This study is motivated by the evidence of global warming, which is caused by human activity but affects the efficiency 
of  the  economy.  We  employ  the  integrated  assessment  Nordhaus  DICE-2007  model  [16].  Generally  speaking,  the 
framework is that of dynamic optimization of the discounted inter-temporal utility of consumption, taking into account 
the economic and the environmental dynamics. The main novelty is that several reasonable types of behavior (policy) of 
the economic agents, which may be non-optimal from the point of view of the global performance but are reasonable 
form an individual point of view and exist in reality, are strictly defined and analyzed. These include the concepts of 
“business as usual”, in which an economic agent ignores her impact on the climate change (although adapting to it), and 
of “free riding with a perfect foresight”, where some economic agents optimize in an adaptive way their individual 
performance expecting that the others would perform in a collectively optimal way. These policies are defined in a formal 
and unified way modifying ideas from the so-called “model predictive control”. The introduced concepts are relevant to 
many other problems of dynamic optimization, especially in the context of resource economics. However, the numerical 
analysis in this paper is devoted to the evolution of the world economy and the average temperature in the next 150 years, 
depending  on  different  scenarios  for  the  behavior  of  the  economic  agents.  In  particular,  the  results  show  that  the 
“business as usual”, although adaptive to the change of the atmospheric temperature, may lead within 150 years to 
increase of temperature by 2°C more than the collectively optimal policy. 
Keywords: environmental economics, dynamic optimization, optimal control, global warming, model predictive control, 
integrated assessment. 
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In his seminal paper, Nordhaus [13] elaborated the very ﬁrst integrated assessment model (IAM)
of the world economy with global warming, the DICE model.1 This paper has been followed by
a plethora of quite similar computational models. Surprisingly, almost all of them are computed
under only two basic runs: an optimal policy (the one that maximizes intertemporal welfare) and
a business-as-usual scenario (no emission abatement). It is by comparing these two scenarios that
the beneﬁts of a global climate policy are assessed. The typical message provided by IAMs is
that slowing down the increase in greenhouse gases is eﬃcient, while stronger emission reductions
would impose signiﬁcant economic costs. Several modeling developments have been carried out to
make IAMs more complex or more realistic (backstop technologies, endogenous growth, resource
exhaustion...), but the two basic scenarios remain. Our aim is to propose alternative—and arguably
more realistic—ways to deﬁne business-as-usual scenarios in integrated assessment models. By doing
this, we also question the costs and beneﬁts of climate policies.
Let us start by explaining why we consider that the two basic scenarios used in IAMs (“optimal
policy” and “business-as-usual”) may be subject of concerned. The reasons why the “optimal policy”
cannot be seen as realistic are well-established in the literature. The optimal policy scenario consists
in maximizing the intertemporal welfare in the economy. It thus assumes a perfect foresight and
benevolent policy makers, or a single representative perfect foresight private agent, which is, in
both cases, far from realism. For this reason, many authors consider that the optimal scenario just
provides a Pareto eﬃcient solution and is not to be considered as a policy scenario as such. As
the best achievable solution, it is a benchmark, but it has little policy relevance. We follow this
interpretation. As far as the business-as-usual (hereafter, BaU) scenario is concerned, the drawbacks
are of a diﬀerent nature. Nordhaus, as well as the following authors, deﬁne the BaU scenario as
the trajectory in productive investment that maximizes intertemporal welfare net of the damages
incurred by global warming, but without emission abatement. In other words, the agent is still
perfect foresighted, but she does not see the impacts of her own decisions on climate change and
the related damages she will bear. This scenario is not only unrealistic (because of perfect foresight),
but it is also rationally inconsistent (because of a combination of perfect foresight and myopia about
climate damages). This is the scenario we question in this paper. 2
Roughly speaking, we model the behavior of an agent doing BaU in the following way: the agent
optimizes her economic objective disregarding her inﬂuence on the environment and taking the
state of the environment as exogenously given. If at some later time the agent encounters changed
1The acronym DICE stands for “Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy”. The ﬁrst version of the DICE model
can also be found in [14] and [15]. See [16] for the latest version. The model is publicly available on Nordhaus’ web
page.
2It is only when the model distinguishes many regions or countries that it becomes able to compute alternative
scenarios based on coalitions of countries. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is the one where each country
implements its optimal policy by taking the strategy of the other countries as given. Because of the global externality,
it is ineﬃcient. The full cooperative equilibrium is the one where all countries cooperate, and it coincides with the
Pareto solution. In between, any coalition can be considered. For such analyses, see e.g. [2, 3, 7, 18].
3environmental conditions, then she updates her optimal policy regarding the new environmental
state, but still ignoring the impact of her economic activity on the environment. The same approach
of the BaU is repeated persistently. We formalize this type of behavior by introducing an idealized
version of the BaU-agent which is independent of the time between subsequent updates. This is
done in a general framework in which the behavior of the economic agents is based on exogenous
predictions for the evolution of the environment instead of predictions regarding the environmental
impact of their economic policies. In particular, also a type of agent’s behavior that resembles the
basic features of free riding (FR) is well deﬁned in our framework as corresponding to a particular
prediction pattern. Even more, we extend our general concept of prediction-based optimality to the
case of multiple agents who may implement diﬀerent decision concepts: some regarding their impact
on the environment, others doing business-as-usual or free riding. The same framework seems to
be relevant and may ﬁnd interesting applications in other problems in resource economics.
The modeling technique that we employ in deﬁning the above solution (behavioral) concepts adapts
ideas from an area in the engendering-oriented control theory known as model predictive control or
receding horizon control (see e.g. [1, 5, 8]). The above theory originates from problems of stabilization
of mechanical systems and its translation to the optimal control context in the present paper rises
a number of mathematical problems that are not profoundly studied in the literature. The key
one is the issue of Lipschitz dependence of the optimal control in a long-horizon optimal control
problem on the initial data and on the optimization horizon (we refer to [4, 6] for a relevant
information). In this paper we take a shortcut by formulating as assumptions all the properties
needed for the correct deﬁnition and results concerning the agent’s behavior. These assumptions
look at ﬁrst glance cumbersome, but they are quite natural and essential. The veriﬁcation of some
of the assumed properties is not easy, in general, and provides an agenda for a future research.
In addition, the fulﬁllment of these assumptions in the main case study in this paper—the global
warming—is rather conditional, as one can learn from the rather striking results in [9] and [10],
but still possible, as argued in Appendix 2.
The paper is organized as follows. Our modiﬁcation of the Nordhaus integrated assessment model
is presented in the next section. In Section 3 we introduce the general concept of prediction-based
optimality and the particular cases of BaU and FR. This concepts are extended in Section 4 to
the case of co-existing agents with diﬀerent behavior. Then in Section 5 we present and discuss
numerical results for the global warming problem. The two appendixes that follow summarize some
technical issues.
2 The world economy facing global warming
Our modeling of the world economy relies on the DICE-2007 model (see [16]). In a nutshell, there
exists a policy maker who maximizes discounted welfare, integrating in the analysis the economic
activity with its production factors, CO2 emissions and its consequences on climate change. Our
climate block reduces to two equations which describe the dynamics of the concentration of CO2
4(depending on emissions) and the interaction between CO2 concentration and temperature change.
In this sense, our modeling looks like previous DICE versions in which the carbon-cycle was not
detailed.
The economy is populated by a constant number of individuals, which we normalize to 1.3 A single
ﬁnal good is produced. This good can either be consumed, invested in the ﬁnal good sector or
used to abate CO2 emissions. A representative agent chooses optimal consumption and abatement
time-dependent policies aiming at maximization of the total inter-temporal discounted utility from
consumption (net of climate damages). The model involves the physical capital, k(t), the CO2
concentration in the atmosphere, m(t), and the average temperature, τ(t), as state variables. The
decision (control) variables are: u(t) – fraction of the GDP used for consumption, and a(t) – emission











subject to (the argument t of k, τ and m is suppressed):
˙ k = −δk + [1 − u(t) − c(a(t))]p(t)ϕ(τ)kγ, k(0) = k0, (2)
˙ τ = −λ(m)τ + d(m), τ(0) = τ0, (3)
˙ m = −νm + (1 − a(t))e(t)p(t)ϕ(τ)kγ + E(τ), m(0) = m0, (4)
u(t), a(t) ∈ [0,1]. (5)
Physical capital accumulation is described by equation (2). Production is realized through a Cobb-
Douglas production function with elasticity γ ∈ (0,1) with respect to physical capital. The depre-
ciation rate is δ > 0. A fraction u of the output is consumed and another part, c(a), is devoted
to CO2 abatement. Here c(a) is the fraction of the output that is used for reducing the emission
intensity by a fraction a.4 The function p(t) stands for productivity level and is assumed exogenous,
while ϕ(τ) represents the impact of the climate on global factor productivity.
The evolution of CO2 concentration is depicted by equation (4), where ν is the natural absorption
rate, E(τ) is the non-industrial emission at temperature τ, and e(t) is the emission for producing one
unit of ﬁnal good without abatement. Finally, (3) establishes the link between CO2 concentration
and temperature change. The CO2 concentration increases the atmospheric temperature directly
through d but also may aﬀect the cooling rate λ. The initial value k0, τ0, m0 are given.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the utility in (1) with respect to consumption is
denoted by α ∈ (0,1), while r > 0 is the discount rate.
The numerical investigation of this model and its versions developed in the next two sections is
postponed to Section 5, where all the above data are speciﬁed. However, before turning to numerical
3Naturally, considering a changing population size over time would be more realistic and would change the nu-
merical results presented below, but it plays no role for the analytic concepts developed in the next two sections.
4Notice that u + c(a) may be greater than one, in principle, in which case existing capital stock is sacriﬁced for
lower emission rate.
5analysis, we shall introduce in the next two sections two alternative solution concepts reﬂecting
possible non-optimal, but still rational and realistic agent’s behavior.
3 Prediction-based optimality: a general consideration
In this section we consider a more general optimal control framework in which we present the basic
concept introduced in this paper—that of prediction-based optimality—and some of its particular
cases. In the explanations below we use the economic/environment interpretation of the variables
given in the above section, although several diﬀerent economic interpretations are meaningful.






subject to the dynamic constraints
˙ x(t) = f(t,v(t),x(t),y(t)), (7)
˙ y(t) = g(t,e(t,v(t),x(t)),y(t)), (8)
x(0) = x0, y(0) = y0, (9)
and the control constraint
v(t) ∈ V. (10)
The state variable x ∈ Rn is interpreted as a vector of stocks of economic factors, while the state
variable y ∈ Rm represents “environmental” (in general sense) factors whose evolution depends
on the economic activity through the function e. The control vector-variable v ∈ V ⊂ Rr may be
interpreted as investment/abatement in diﬀerent sectors and (6) maximizes the aggregated output
(or utility). The function e(t,v,x) has values in a ﬁnite dimensional space and represents the impact
of the economic control, v, and the economic state, x, on the dynamics of the environment.
The measurable functions v : [0,∞)  → V will be called admissible controls. The model (7)–(8) will
be considered as relevantly representing the evolution of the environmental-economic system. Thus
for any given economic input v(t) we identify the corresponding solution x(t), y(t) with the real
economic-environmental state.
The particular case of the world economy facing global warming, presented in the previous
section, corresponds to the speciﬁcations x = k, y = (m,τ), v = (u,a), e(t,v,x) = (1 −
a(t))e(t)p(t)ϕ(τ)Kγ.5
5Note that there is an overloading of notations: the dimensions m and r in the general model have nothing to do
with the concentration m and the discount r, etc. This could in no way lead to a confusion.
6Let (ˆ v, ˆ x, ˆ y) be a solution of problem (6)–(10) (this problem is called further OPT). Our basic
argument is that, in real life, the motives for the decision-makers are to a large extend self-interest.
They are also narrow-minded in the sense where they are unable to grasp the whole picture. The last
token means that the agent does not necessarily believe, or is not fully aware of equation (8). As a
consequence, agent’s decisions need not result in resembling the optimal path (ˆ v, ˆ x, ˆ y). The question
is now of how to deﬁne alternative behavioral patterns? Below we deﬁne a concept of optimality
which is not directly based on the model (8) of the environment, rather, on a prediction of the future
environment obtained otherwise. Namely, we assume that at any time s the representative economic
agent obtains a prediction for the environmental variable y(t) on a (presumably large) horizon
[s,s+θ], depending on the history of y on some interval [s−κ,s] and on the current economic state
x(s). This prediction will be given by a mapping (predictor) Es : Cm(s − κ,s) × Rn  → Cm(s,∞),
that is, Es(y|[s−κ,s],x(s))(t), is the prediction of y(t) for t ≥ s that results from a history y|[s−κ,s] of
y and the current economic state x(s). In fact, only the values y(t) for t ∈ [s,s + θ] will be taken
into account in the construction below.6
3.1 Step-wise deﬁnition
The starting idea is rather similar to that of the so-called model predictive control, or receding
horizon control (see e.g. [1, 5, 8]). It is that, at time t = 0, the agent uses the prediction y(t) =
E(y|[−κ,0],x0)(t) to solve the problem (6), (7), (9), (10) on the time horizon [0,θ] (that is, with
bounds of integration in (6) set to [0,θ] instead of [0,∞)). Notice that this problem involves only
the economic component of the overall model, while the environment y(t) is taken as exogenous.
The optimal control v, although obtained on the horizon [0,θ], is implemented on a “small” time
interval [0,t1], after which the agent observes that the actual value of the environment, y(t1), has
changed from the predicted one and repeats the same procedure with an updated prediction for y
given by E(y|[t1−κ,t1],x(t1))(t).7 The formal deﬁnition of the respective agent’s behaviour is given
below.
Assume that the past data y(t) for t ∈ [−κ,0] are known. Let at times ti = ih the agent reevaluates
the past evolution of the environmental state y by measurements, where h > 0 is a positive time-
step; presumably h << θ. We denote σ = (h,θ) and deﬁne a path (vσ,xσ,yσ) recursively as follows.
Set yσ = y(t) for t ∈ [−κ,0], xσ(0) = x0. Assume that (vσ,xσ,yσ) is already deﬁned on [0,tk],






6Further on we skip the subscript s in Es, since it will be clear from the arguments of E. Moreover, the two
particular predictors we shall consider below are shift-invariant, thus the subscript s is, in fact, redundant.
7Such a step-wise revision is consistent with the fact that, in climate science, a climate regime is deﬁned by
averaging a 30-year time period. So a changing in a climate regime can be statistically demonstrated only after
several decades.
7˙ x(t) = f(t,e(t,v(t),x(t)),yk(t)), x(tk) = xσ(tk), (12)





(t) for t ∈ [tk,tk + θ]. Let vk+1 be an optimal control of this
problem on [tk,tk +θ]. We deﬁne vσ on [tk,tk+1] as equal to vk+1, and extend continuously (xσ,yσ)
as the respective solution of (7), (8) on [tk,tk+1].




The idea is clear: the agent follows his optimal policy based on the prediction for the environment at
time s for a future period of length h, after which she realizes that the real environment has declined
from the prediction and re-solves the optimization problem again with an updated prediction. The
deﬁnition below is a mathematical idealization in which the re-evaluation period h tends to zero.
This makes the resulting process independent of the particular choice of step h.
Deﬁnition 1 Every limit point of any sequence (vσ,xσ,yσ) (deﬁned as above) in the space
Lloc
1 (0,∞)×C(0,∞)×C(0,∞) when σ = (h,θ) −→ (0,+∞) (if such exists) will be called prediction-
based optimal solution8.
Remark 1 We stress that neither the existence nor the uniqueness of a prediction-based optimal
solution is granted. “Academic” counterexamples can easily be constructed. Even more, for a similar
“global warming” model as the one presented in Section 2 a non-uniqueness of the optimal solution
for initial data lying on a certain “critical” hyperplane in the state space was established in [10]. For
this model the existence and the uniqueness of a prediction-based optimal solution are questionable
for “critical” initial data. Therefore, the conditions for existence and uniqueness stated below in
this section for a particular prediction map E, although not necessary in general, are essential.
3.2 Two special prediction mappings
Two special cases of prediction-based optimality for two diﬀerent predictors E are of special interest:
a business-as-usual scenario and a free-rider scenario.
1. Business as Usual (BaU)
If the environmental quality y is slowly changing compared with the economic factors x, then
the representative agent may interpret the observed changes of y as unpredictable or exogenous
ﬂuctuations around an equilibrium, not substantially aﬀected by the economic activity. In other
words, it reﬂects some natural exogenous ﬂuctuations (for example, the eﬀect of solar activity on the
8A sequence z
σ converges to z in C(0,∞) if it converges uniformly on every compact interval [0,T]. A sequence
v





σ(t) − v(t)|dt converges to zero for every T > 0.
8global temperature on earth’s surface). As a result, the agent may reasonably take a time-invariant















(t) = y(s), t ∈ [s,s+θ]
(this corresponds to κ = 0).
This approach of the agents, which disregards the dynamics of the environment although adapting
to its changes a posteriori, will be called Business as Usual (BaU).
The simplest case of BaU is that with κ = 0, which is realistic in a slowly changing environment.






˙ x(t) = f(t,e(t,v(t),x(t)),y), x(s) = xs, t ∈ [s,s + θ],
where s ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0,∞), xs ∈ Rn and y ∈ Rm are given. Denote by ˆ v[s,θ,xs;y](t) a solution of
this problem (assuming that such exists). Then the step-wise approximation (vσ,xσ,yσ) of BaU for
σ = (h,θ) can be written (recursively in k) as
vσ(t) = ˆ v[tk,θ,xσ(tk);yσ(tk)](t), t ∈ [tk,tk+1], (13)
(xσ,yσ) solves (7), (8) with v = vσ. (14)
The initial conditions in (14) are given by (9) at tk = t0 = 0, while xσ,yσ are extended by continuity
at each tk > 0.
Clearly, in the context of the previous section the BaU approach has been practically the only
one implemented by agents at all levels till the late 20th century, and is still dominating in many
countries. It consists in being conservative in the understanding of nature’s law. This BaU scenario,
however, is rationally consistent.
2. Free riders (FR)
There exists a presumably large number of (identical or not) agents in the economy, which therefore
can be viewed as represented (aggregated) by a single representative agent. The representative agent
determines the collectively optimal policy ˆ v by solving the problem (6)–(10). In particular, the y-
component of the solution, ˆ y, gives the future development of the environment if the optimal policy
were implemented by all agents. But some agents may free ride. A free rider is an agent that assumes
that the other agents would implement the optimal policy, and since the inﬂuence of a single agent
on the environment is negligible, she may take ˆ y(t) as predictor for the future environment and
design her own optimal policy solving (6), (7), (9), (10) with y = ˆ y (which policy is, in general,
diﬀerent from the collectively optimal one, ˆ v).
9In this section we consider an “extreme” scenario in which all agents undertake free riding. In
sections 4 and 5.3 we shall investigate the more realistic case of co-existing agents with diﬀer-
ent behavior, some following the optimal policy regarding the inﬂuence of the economy on the
environment (OPT), some others practicing BaU or FR.
Formally, the predictor E of a FR is deﬁned as follows. Denote by (ˆ x[s,xs,ys], ˆ y[s,xs,ys]) the
optimal trajectory of problem (6)–(10) on the interval [s,∞) (instead of [0,∞)) and with initial
data x(s) = xs, y(s) = ys at time s (replacing (9)). Then the predictor E is deﬁned as
E(y|[s−κ,s],x)(t) = ˆ y[s,x,y(s)](t).
That is, the hypothetical collectively optimal evolution of the environment starting from the current
data is used as a predictor.
3.3 Feedback deﬁnition of BaU-solution: existence and uniqueness
Here we present another point of view to the optimality concepts introduced above focusing for
more transparency on the simplest BaU – that with κ = 0. The general case requires appropriate
modiﬁcations and assumptions concerning the predictor E.
Although in the assumptions below we do not seek generality (they are just reasonably general, so
that several applications satisfy them) they are rather implicit and will be discussed in Appendix 2.
Assume the following:
Assumption A1: (i) Let X ⊂ Rn, Y ⊂ Rm and V ∈ Rr be given sets and let E be a set containing
all vectors e(t,v,x) with t ≥ 0, v ∈ V , x ∈ X. The functions f(t,v,x,y), g(t,e,y), L(t,v,x,y),
e(t,v,x) are bounded, continuous in t and Lipschitz continuous in the rest of the variables, v ∈ V ,
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and e ∈ E, uniformly with respect to t. Moreover, x0 ∈ X and y0 ∈ Y .
(ii) For every admissible control v, every s ≥ 0, xs ∈ X and ys ∈ Y the solution of (17), (18), with
initial conditions x(s) = xs, y(s) = ys, exists in X × Y on [s,∞).
Assumption (A2). (i) For every s ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0,∞), xs ∈ X and ys ∈ Y the optimal control
ˆ v[s,θ,xs;ys]( ) exists and is unique in the space L1([s,s + θ]).
(ii) There exist a number ˆ l and a continuous function δ : [0,∞)  → [0,∞), with δ(0) = 0, such that
for every t ≥ s ≥ 0, ˜ θ ≥ θ ≥ t − s, x, ˜ x ∈ X, y, ˜ y ∈ Y the following inequality holds:
￿ ￿
￿ˆ v[s,θ,x;y](t) − ˆ v[t, ˜ θ, ˜ x; ˜ y](t)
￿ ￿
￿ ≤ ˆ l (|x − ˜ x| + |y − ˜ y|) + δ
￿





Let T be any positive number. Assumptions A2 together with the completeness of the space C([s,T])
imply that for every s ∈ [0,T], xs ∈ X and ys ∈ Y the sequence ˆ v[s,θ,xs;ys] converges in the space
C([s,T]) whit θ −→ ∞ to a continuous admissible control denoted by ˆ v[s,∞,xs;ys].
10Proposition 1 Under A1, A2 a unique BaU-solution in the sense of Deﬁnition 1 exists and coin-
cides with the unique solution of the feedback system
˙ x(t) = f(t,ˆ v[t,∞,x(t);y(t)](t),x(t),y(t)), x(0) = x0, (15)
˙ y(t) = g(t,e(t, ˆ v[t,∞,x(t);y(t)](t),x(t)),y(t)), y(0) = y0. (16)
We skip the proof (which is a standard exercise in calculus), but in fact it is contained in the proof
of the more complicated Proposition 2, which is given in Appendix 1.
The feedback system (15), (16) provides an alternative to Deﬁnition 1. This is an easy shortcut
to the concept of BaU-solution. However, Deﬁnition 1 reﬂects in a better way the practical BaU-
behavior, where the stepwise policy vθ
h is implemented. Therefore the issue of convergence of the
step-wise BaU-control vθ
h is of key importance for the credibility of the idealization (15), (16) and, in
addition, provides a numerical approach for ﬁnding the BaU-solution, implemented in our numerical
analysis of the global warming problem in Section 5.
4 Co-existing agents with diﬀerent behavior
In the previous section we considered the scenario in which all economic agents behave in the
same way, therefore can be represented by a single agent which either optimizes by solving the
full economic-environment problem (6)–(10) (we call such an agent OPT), or chooses the BaU
or the FR behavior. In the present section we consider the case of co-existence of agents with
diﬀerent behavior. For reasons of transparency we focus on the simplest case of two agents (groups
of countries): one OPT and one BaU.
Let v1 and v2 be the controls of the OPT and of the BaU, and x1 and x2 be their economic states.
Assuming additivity of the environmental impact e of the economic activities of the two agents
(which is the case if polluting emissions such as CO2 are considered), we reformulate the dynamics
of the economic-environment system as
˙ xi(t) = fi(t,vi(t),xi(t),y(t)), xi(0) = x0
i, i = 1,2, (17)
˙ y(t) = g(t,e1(t,v1(t),x1(t)) + e2(t,v2(t),x2(t)),y(t)), y(0) = y0, (18)
with the control constraints
vi(t) ∈ V, i = 1,2. (19)




Here the ﬁnite dimensional vector ei(t,vi,xi) represents the instantaneous emission of the agent i
resulting from control value vi and economic state xi at time t. Below we investigate the evolution
11of such an economic-environment system, adapting the concept of BaU developed in the previous
section. Agent 2 optimizes her utility in a BaU manner, while agent 1 optimizes her utility regarding
the environmental change. The complication of the coexisting BaU and OPT agents comes from
the fact that they live in a common environment, y(t), which they both inﬂuence, therefore their
respective optimal policies are not independent of each other. Namely, in order to solve her problem
OPT has to know the inﬂuence of BaU on the environment. On the other hand, BaU adapts her
decision to the environmental change (in a similar manner as in the previous section), which on its
turn depends on the policy of OPT.
The idea of the formal deﬁnition of co-existing OPT and BaU is as follows. The agent BaU (agent
i = 2) ﬁrst solves her optimal control problem (17), (19), (20) (with i = 2) on [0,θ] using the
predictor y(t) = y0. This deﬁnes a hypothetical emission η2(t) = e2(t,v2(t),x2(t)) of the BaU-agent
for all t ∈ [0,θ]. The BaU implements her control only on a short interval [0,h], but nevertheless






˙ x1(t) = f1(t,v1(t),x1(t),y(t)), x1(0) = x0
1, (22)
˙ y(t) = g(t,e1(t,v1(t),x1(t)) + η2(t),y(t)), y(0) = y0. (23)
Agent OPT implements the so obtained control on [0,h]. The controls of both agents being chosen
on [0,h] determine the evolution of the overall system on this interval according to (17), (18). Then
the same procedure is repeated on [h,h + θ] to determine the evolution on [h,2h], and so on.
To deﬁne formally the above step-wise procedure we introduce the following notations: similarly as
in the previous section, ˆ v2[s,θ,xs






˙ x2(t) = f2(t,v2(t),x2(t),ys), x2(s) = xs
2, (25)
and ˆ x2[s,θ,xs
2;ys](t) – the corresponding optimal trajectory. Denote by ˆ v1[s,θ,xs
1,ys;η2( )](t) a
solution of the problem (21)–(23) on the interval [s,s + θ] (instead of [0,θ)), and with initial data
x1(s) = xs
1, y(s) = ys, and with the function η2 exogenously given.
Let σ = (h,θ) ba a ﬁxed pair of a “small” h > 0 and a “large” θ > 0 and let tσ
k = kh. Fix a





9 The assumption that OPT uses the emission of BaU resulting from the current BaU control for a long horizon
ahead, although BaU implements the current control only on a short horizon, may look somewhat questionable in
the context of the global warming. One supporting argument is that in reality OPT may not know in advance how
frequently BaU would adjust her policy (that is, how large is h). An alternative deﬁnition of combined OPT-BaU
behavior will be discussed in the end of the section. The numerical results obtained for the global warming problem
using the two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of OPT-BaU behavior are practically indistinguishable.
12assuming that it is already deﬁned till time tσ
k (for k = 0 only the initial x0
i and y0 are required for
the recursion). Deﬁne
˜ vσ
















2(τ) = e2(τ, ˜ vσ
2(τ), ˜ xσ









2( )](t) and vσ
2(t) = ˜ vσ





2(t),yσ(t)) – the solution of (17), (18) on [tσ
k,tσ






and the above deﬁned controls vσ
1 and vσ
2.
This completes the recurrent deﬁnition of step-wise OPT-BaU solution.
Deﬁnition 2 Every limit point of a sequence (vσ
1,vσ
2) deﬁned as above whith h → 0 and θ → +∞
in Lloc
1 (0,∞) (if such exists) will be called OPT-BaU solution of the optimization system (17)–(20).
Below we formulate conditions for existence of an OPT-BaU solution. Moreover, it will be proved
that the OPT-BaU solution is independent of the choice of the parameter ρ > 1 in the step-wise
deﬁnition.
Assumption A1′: (i) Let X ⊂ Rn, Y ⊂ Rm and V ∈ Rr be given open sets and let E be a
set containing all vectors e1(t,v1,x1) + e2(t,v2,x2) with t ≥ 0, vi ∈ V , xi ∈ X. The functions
fi(t,v,x,y), g(t,e,y), Li(t,v,x,y), ei(t,v,x) are bounded, continuous in t and Lipschitz continuous
in the rest of the variables, v ∈ V , x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and e ∈ E, uniformly with respect to t. Moreover,
x0
i ∈ X and y0 ∈ Y .
(ii) For every admissible controls v1 and v2, every s ≥ 0, xs
i ∈ X and ys ∈ Y the solution of (17),
(18), with initial conditions xi(s) = xs
i, y(s) = ys, exists in X × X × Y on [s,∞).
Assumption A2′: (i) For every s ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0,∞), xs ∈ X, ys ∈ Y , and continuous η2 : [s,s+θ] → E
the optimal controls ˆ v1[s,θ,xs,ys;η2( )]( ) and ˆ v2[s,θ,xs;ys]( ) exist and are unique in L1(s,s+θ).
(ii) There exist a number ˆ l, and continuous functions δ, α : [0,∞)  → [0,∞), with δ(0) = 0, such
that for every t ≥ s ≥ 0, ˜ θ ≥ θ ≥ t − s, x, ˜ x ∈ X, y, ˜ y ∈ Y and continuous functions continuous
η2, ˜ η2 : [0,∞)  → E the following inequality holds:
￿ ￿
￿ˆ v1[s,θ,x,y;η2](t) − ˆ v1[t, ˜ θ, ˜ x, ˜ y; ˜ η2](t)
￿ ￿
￿
≤ ˆ l (|x − ˜ x| + |y − ˜ y|) + δ
￿







α(τ − s)|η2(τ) − ˜ η2(τ)| dτ.
(iii) There exist continuous functions δ, β : [0,∞)  → [0,∞], with δ(0) = 0 and
R ∞
0 α(τ)β(τ)dτ <
∞, such that for every t ≥ s ≥ 0, ˜ θ ≥ θ ≥ 0, τ ∈ [t,s + θ), x, ˜ x ∈ X and y, ˜ y ∈ Y the following
inequality holds:
￿ ￿




￿ˆ x2[s,θ,x;y](τ) − ˆ x2[t, ˜ θ, ˜ x; ˜ y](τ)
￿ ￿
￿
≤ β(τ − s)
￿
|x − ˜ x| + |y − ˜ y| + δ
￿
|s − t| +
1
s + θ − τ
￿￿
.
13As mentioned in the introduction, assumptions A2′ look very cumbersome, although they just
relevantly represent the requirement of Lipschitz dependence of the optimal solution on the initial
data and on the length of the horizon. What “relevantly” does mean here? For example, the nastier
looking term δ in A2′(iii) reﬂects the fact that the optimal control on a long horizon [s,s + θ] is
strongly inﬂuenced near the end of the horizon by the fact that the optimization disregards what
happens after s+θ. Thus the solution on [s,s+θ] needs not be close to the one for a longer horizon
˜ θ for t near s+θ. The next lemma claims that the dependence of the optimal solution on the length
of the horizon is signiﬁcant only near the end of the horizon, that is, it melts out if the horizon is
inﬁnite.
Lemma 1 For every s ≥ 0, (x,y) ∈ X × Y and continuous η2 : [0,∞)  → E the limits
ˆ v1[s,∞,x,y;η2](s) := lim
θ→∞
ˆ v1[s,θ,x,y;η2](s),
ˆ v2[s,∞,x;y]( ) := lim
θ→∞
ˆ v2[s,θ,x;y]( ), ˆ x2[s,∞,x;y]( ) := lim
θ→∞
ˆ x2[s,θ,x;y]( )
exist, the last two in C(s,∞).
The ﬁrst claim follows from A2′(ii) applied for t = s, ˜ x = x, ˜ y = y, η2 = ˜ η2. The second and the
third ones use similarly A2′(iii) and also the completeness of the space C(0,T).
To shorten the notations we abbreviate
η2[x2,y](t, ) = e2( , ˆ v2[t,∞,x2;y]( ), ˆ x2[t,∞,x2;y]( )),
v1[x1,x2,y](t) = ˆ v1[t,∞,x1,y;η2[x2,y](t, )](t), v2[x2,y](t) = ˆ v2[t,∞,x2;y](t),
η1[x1,x2,y](t) = e1(t,v1[x1,x2,y](t),x1).
Proposition 2 Under A1′ and A2′, a combined OPT/BaU-optimal solution in the sense of Deﬁ-
nition 2 exists and coincides with the unique solution of the feedback system
˙ x1 = f(t,v1[x1,x2,y](t),x1,y), x1(0) = x0
1, (26)
˙ x2 = f(t,v2[x2,y](t),x2,y), x2(0) = x0
2, (27)
˙ y(t) = g(t,η1[x1,x2,y](t) + η2[x2,y](t,t),y), y(0) = y0, (28)
where the argument t of x1(t), x2(t) and y(t) is suppressed.
Notice that η2[x2,y](t,t) in equation (28) equals just e2(t, ˆ v2[t,∞,x2;y](t),x2).
The proof is given in Appendix 1.
Similarly as for the case of a pure BaU solution, the approximate calculation of OPT-BaU solutions
makes use of the intuitive step-wise deﬁnition.
14As we mentioned in footnote 9 a diﬀerent reasonable deﬁnition of OPT-BaU solution may be given,
which assumes more sophisticated behaviour of the OPT-agent. Namely, in the above step-wise
deﬁnition OPT uses at every step the prediction of the future emission ˜ η2(t) of BaU, not taking
into account that BaU may adapt in the next time-period to the change of the environmental
variable y. A more involved OPT-agent may take into account the inﬂuence of her own decisions
to the adjustment of the BaU-control.
Below we brieﬂy formulate the resulting reﬁned concept of OPT-BaU solution, considering directly
the “idealized” limit-version with inﬁnite horizon and instantaneous adjustment of BaU.
The deﬁnition will be of ﬁxed-point type. Imagine that OPT bases her solution on a guess η2 ∈
Lloc







˙ x1(t) = f1(t,v1(t),x1(t),y(t)), x1(0) = x0
1,
˙ y(t) = g(t,e1(t,v1(t),x1(t)) + η2(t),y(t)), y(0) = y0.
Denote by (v∗
1[η2],x∗




1[η2](t)) – the corresponding emission. Then BaU obtains the BaU-optimal solu-









˙ x2(t) = f2(t,v2(t),x2(t),y(t)), x2(0) = x0
2,
˙ y(t) = g(t,η1[η2](t) + e2(t,v2(t),x2(t)),y(t)), y(0) = y0.
Let (v∗
2[η2],x∗
2[η2]) be BaU-optimal solution, thus η∗
2[η2](t) = e2(t,v∗
2[η2](t),x∗
2[η2](t)) is the resulting
emission of the BaU-agent. Now we complete the deﬁnition by requiring that the initial guess of
OPT is consistent with the obtained real emission output:
η∗
2[η2] = η2. (29)
This is a functional equation that determines the “right” initial guess η2 of OPT.
We do not address the apparently complicated issue of existence of a solution to the above functional
equation, since Deﬁnition 2 seems to be more relevant to the real behaviour of the OPT and
BaU agents. In addition, iterating the ﬁx-point equation (29), using as an initial guess the BaU
emission η2(t) in the OPT-BaU solution in sense of Deﬁnition 2 for our global warming model,
we establish that there is no considerable diﬀerence between the two OPT-BaU solution concepts
for this particular model. Therefore, further we focus on the OPT-BaU solution concept given by
Deﬁnition 2.
155 Numerical analysis of the world economy under global warming
In this section we provide numerical illustrations for the diﬀerent decision patterns deﬁned above,
with an application to the global warming issue. Firstly, the computational model and its calibration
are presented. Then we compute Business-as-usual (BaU) and Optimal (OPT) scenarios and, in
the last subsection, we consider the case of co-existing agents.
5.1 The computational model and its calibration
The model is a Nordhaus-type integrated assessment model of the climate and the economy. The
calibration is made in such a way that we replicate the central 2007 IPCC scenarios in terms
of carbon emissions and temperature increase.10 The abatement cost function and the damage
function are calibrated to replicate Nordhaus’ orders of magnitude. So it must be clear that there
is nothing new in the model itself, because we want to focus on new behavioral rules. We compute
numerically the economy described in section 2 over a period of T = 300 years. To get rid of
boundary eﬀects we display results only for the ﬁrst 175 years. The time slice is the year, and for
the discretization scheme we choose a time step h = 0.05 years. Table 1 displays the parameters
value and initial conditions for the economic and climatic parts of the model. We have deliberately
chosen a low value for the interest rate (with respect to the values chosen by Nordhaus in the
DICE model) because of the arguments given by [11] and [17]. We consider that, given the length
of our exercise, such a low value is necessary to fully take into account the welfare of far future
generations. The initial values for the state variables are k0 = 733.2, the initial value of physical
capital (in billion dollars), m0 = 808.9, the carbon concentration in 2005 (in GtC) and τ0 = 0.7307
the initial temperature increase (between 1900 and 2005, in ◦C).
Table 1: Parameters value
Economic parameters
depreciation rate δ 0.1
intertemporal elasticity of substitution α 0.5
interest rate r 0.005
capital elasticity γ 0.75
Climate parameters
temperature reabsorption λ 0.11
climate sensitivity η 0.0054
preindustrial carbon concentration m∗
0 596.4
damage function parameter θ1 0.0057
damage function parameter θ2 2
CO2 reabsorption rate ν 0.0054
10The 2007 IPCC report is available on line at: www.ipcc.ch.
16In what follows, we describe the functional forms for the functions p, e, ϕ, c and d. There exists
an exogenous technological progress, p(t). It is a linear function of time such that p(0) = 1 and
p(175) = 1.25. The exogenous technology which reduces carbon emission intensity with time, e(t),
is an exponential function verifying that e(0) = 0.0427 and e(75) = 0.75e(0); i.e. we assume an
exogenous decrease in the emission output intensity by 25% in 75 years. All these assumptions are
within common ranges.11
The damage function has a standard formulation ϕ(τ) = 1/(1+θ1τθ2). The calibration captures the
impact of global warming on global productivity: a 2◦C increase in the mean temperature reduces
the global productivity by 3%. We assume c(a) = 0.01a/(1−a); i.e. c(0) = 0 and lima→1 c(a) = ∞.
The calibration implies that reducing the emission output intensity by 50% incurs a cost of 1%
of GDP. The eﬀect of CO2 concentration on the average temperature increase is captured by the
standard function d(m) = ηln(m/m∗
0): a doubling of CO2 concentration increases the average
temperature by 0.41◦C per year, where m∗
0 = 596.4 GtC is the preindustrial CO2 concentration in
the atmosphere.
5.2 A comparison between BaU and OPT scenarios
The ﬁrst exercise we perform shows convergence of the BaU trajectory as revisions take place more
frequently. Figure 1 shows the trajectory for the share of output to be consumed, u, under two
BaU scenarios in which two revision schemes are considered, after 10 years (dashed line) and after
5 years (dotted line). One can see that the trajectory converges towards a smooth BaU as the
revision scheme becomes shorter. When the revision scheme is slow, (every 10 years) the share of
output that is consumed moves too slowly. In other words, too much capital is invested in order to
have more consumption in the future. The trade-oﬀ between consumption and investment is biased
because the agent under-estimates the climate damages that will occur in the far future. When the
revision occurs, the agent realizes her mistake and she sharply decreases capital accumulation. But
then again, she makes the same kind of mistake during a decade. This balance between the mistake
(too much capital accumulation and too much emissions) and the revision becomes smoother as
the economy approaches the steady state. It must be noticed that the correction is sharp because
there are no adjustment costs in our model. The movements in consumption would be smoother if
adjustment costs were considered on capital accumulation or on emission abatement.
Next we have computed the world economy in which the OPT policy maker can abate, i.e. she
can devote a share of output to reduce CO2 emissions. Results for the OPT and BaU scenarios are
displayed in ﬁgure 2.
In the OPT scenario, the share of output that is consumed (panel a) is always larger than in the
BaU scenario. It results that capital accumulation is always smaller (panel d). Interestingly, the
gap between these two trajectories shrinks with time (panels d), and the capital stock is almost
11See the IPCC (2007), Nordhaus (2008), Stern (2008) and Yang (2009).





Figure 1: BaU convergence. Share of output consumed. Legend: BaU 10 years (dashes), BaU 5 years (dots).
the same in the two scenarios at the end of the simulation period. So, what makes the diﬀerence
between the two scenarios is the transition path.
Actually, the consumption level is not always higher in OPT than in BaU (despite the fact that
the share is always higher). Let us study the reasons: BaU’s larger investment induces not only a
larger level of physical capital and production in the future (all else equal) but also more emissions
and consequently a larger temperature increase. Damages only come out in the long run. So at
the beginning of the simulation period, consumption level is higher is OPT, but because the BaU
accumulates more capital, it brings a larger consumption level between period 35 and 88. After
period 85, the costs of global warming become large and capital accumulation is refrained in BaU.
And consumption is again larger in OPT. The feed-back eﬀect of climate on the economy is sharp:
economic growth is almost zero in BaU after period 60.
Panel b) shows the abatement rate. Provided the abatement cost function we have chosen, an
abatement rate of 45% is optimal since the very ﬁrst time period. Abatement then increases and
reaches its maximum after 40 years at roughly 52%. In the long run, emissions are thus cut by
33%. As a result, under this OPT scenario the temperature is reduced in the long-run by 2◦C with
respect to the BaU scenario.
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Figure 2: Optimal solutions under abatement. Legend: OPT (solid line), BaU (dotted line)
195.3 Co-existing agents with diﬀerent strategies
Let us now consider that there exist two agents in the economy. These two agents are of the same
size and have similar initial capital endowment. One agent follows a BaU scenario, the other follows
an OPT scenario. Naturally, they share the same global temperature increase.
The BaU-agent maximizes her utility by choosing her optimal trajectory {u(t)}t≥0, assuming that
the climate is not aﬀected by her economic activity, i.e. she assumes τ(t) = τ0, ∀t ≥ 0. Actually,
the climate is modiﬁed by her activity and her actual consumption will diﬀer from the expected
one. The OPT-agent chooses {u(t),a(t)}t≥0 and takes into account the temperature increase due to
her production plan. Besides, she knows the BaU-agent’s decisions and incorporates them into the
dynamics of carbon concentration in the atmosphere. It must be stressed that, because the BaU-
agent’s optimal decisions are not realized, the OPT-agent computes ‘pseudo-optimal’ trajectories.
Provided BAU-agent and OPT-agent decisions, we compute in a ﬁnal step actual CO2 emissions
and temperature change. Every ﬁve years both agents revise their decisions after noticing the
divergence between their expected and realized consumption levels.
With these two agents we are able to compare three economies. In the two ﬁrst, two similar agents
co-exist, two BaU-agents or two OPT-agents. Actually, these two cases provide the same solution as
the economy with a single BaU or a single OPT initially endowed with double amounts of physical
capital and labor. The last economy that can be considered is the one where two diﬀerent agents
co-exist, one BaU and one OPT. In this latter case, even though the two agents are initially of the
same size, they will become diﬀerent as time goes on because they follow diﬀerent decisions rules.
Figure 3 displays the main results. Let us stress that emissions, capital stock and consumption are
expressed per capita.
In the economy with one BaU-agent and one OPT-agent, emissions and global warming are in
between single OPT and single BaU, simply because one agent does not abate (see panel e and
f). Nevertheless, global emissions and temperature are closer to the single BaU than to the single
OPT, which reveals that the eﬀectiveness of the OPT-agent abatement eﬀorts is rather small. The
striking result in this two-agent economy is that the BaU-agent can accumulate more capital than
the OPT-agent, because she spends nothing in abatement. Thus she enjoys a higher consumption
level than the OPT-agent during the whole simulation period. There exists a clear incentive to
free-ride. In the meantime, the OPT-agent does her best to combat global warming. As a result,
her consumption level turns out to be quite close to the single BaU scenario during the whole
simulation period (see panel c). By playing BaU instead of OPT, the BaU-agent is better-oﬀ until
period 115. Surprisingly, the OPT-agent is also better-oﬀ, but for a shorter time span (until period
80). Then, both are worst-oﬀ (w.r.t. two-OPT) because the climate is warming too much.
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Figure 3: Two coexisting agents. Legend: OPT-OPT (solid line), OPT in OPT-BAU (dashed line), BAU in
OPT-BAU (dash-dotted line), BAU-BAU (dotted line).
216 Conclusion
In this paper we reconsider agents decision rules in an integrated assessment model ` a la Nordhaus.
To depart from the standard ill-deﬁned Business-as-Usual scenario we propose alternative – and
arguably more realistic – behavioral decision rules. The modeling technique we use adapts ideas
from an area in the engendering-oriented control theory, known as model predictive control. This
allows us to model two speciﬁc prediction mappings leading to Business-as-Usual (BaU) and Free-
Riding decision rules, and to compare them with the Optimal scenario (OPT). In both scenarios,
the agent revises her decisions on a regular basis by using exogenous predictions for the evolution
of the environment. Existence and uniqueness of the BaU solution is established. We also consider
the case of an economy with two co-existing agents having diﬀerent decision rules, one following
BaU and the other OPT. The existence is also establish. These concepts are then illustrated with
a numerical application to the global warming issue. We ﬁrst consider the BaU scenario and show
how the revision process shapes the trajectory of the economy. By comparing BaU with OPT, it
is shown that the over accumulation of capital in the former leads to large climate damages, thus
stopping economic growth after a while. Finally, in a two-agent economy we show that there exists
a strong incentive to play BaU instead of OPT.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
First we mention that ˆ vi and ˆ x2 satisfy A2’(ii) and A2’(iii) also with θ and ˜ θ (or only ˜ θ) set formally
to ∞. This is because ˆ l, α and β are independent of θ. Then with xi, ˜ xi ∈ X, y, ˜ y ∈ Y we have for
τ ≥ t
|η2[x2,y](t,τ) − η2[˜ x2, ˜ y](t,τ)|
≤ l(|ˆ v2[t,∞,x;y](τ) − ˆ v2[t,∞, ˜ x; ˜ y](τ)| + |ˆ x2[t,∞,x;y](τ) − ˆ x2[t,∞, ˜ x; ˜ y](τ)|)
≤ lβ(τ − t)(|x − ˜ x| + |y − ˜ y|)
where l is the Lipschitz constant of e2. Hence,
|v1[x1,x2,y](t) − v1[˜ x1, ˜ x2, ˜ y](t)| = |ˆ v1[t,∞,x1,y;η2[x2,y](t, )](t) − ˆ v1[t,∞, ˜ x1, ˜ y;η2[˜ x2, ˜ y](t, )](t)|
≤ ˆ l
￿
|x − ˜ x| + |y − ˜ y| +
Z ∞
t
α(τ − t)|η2[x2,y](t,τ) − η2[x2,y](t,τ)|dτ
￿





α(τ − t)lβ(τ − t)dτ
￿
≤ C(|x − ˜ x| + |y − ˜ y|),
where C is a ﬁnite number. Thus v1 in (26)–(28) depends in a Lipschitz way on x1, x2 and y. The
same applies obviously to v2 and η1. The function η2(t,t) that enters in (28) is also Lipschitz in x2
and y according to the expression after Proposition 2, A1′ and A2′(iii).
Thus the right-hand side of system (26)–(28) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x1, x2 and y.
Then a unique solution (x∗
i,y∗) exists at least locally. Obviously this triple solves also (17), (18)
22with
v∗
1(t) = ˆ v1[t,∞,x∗
1(t),y∗(t);η∗
2(t, )](t), v∗




2(t, ) = e2( , ˆ v2[t,∞,x∗
2(t);y∗(t)]( ), ˆ v2[t,∞,x∗
2(t);y∗(t)]( )) = η2[x∗
2(t),y∗(t)](t, ).
In particular, A1′(ii) implies that (x∗
i,y∗) is extendible to [0,∞).
Now we consider an arbitrary pair σ = (h,θ) with h > 0, (ρ − 1)θ > h (the last inequality is not
restrictive, since later we shall let h → 0, θ → +∞). We shall compare (x∗
i,y∗) with the step-wise
OPT-BaU solution (vσ
i ,xσ
i ,yσ), corresponding to σ. Denote tσ










2(t)| + |(yσ(t) − y∗(t)|)
for k = 0,1,..., and with tσ
−1 redeﬁned as 0.
Obviously we have εσ
0 = 0. We shall recurrently estimate εσ
k+1 by εσ
k. In doing this we use A2′ and
the fact that
|˙ x∗
1(t)| + |˙ x∗
2(t)| + |˙ y∗(t)| ≤ M for every t ≥ 0,















and similarly for y.









k)](t) − ˆ v2[t,∞,x∗
2(t);y∗(t)](t)|









k + ρθ − t
￿￿




















where C1 is independent of σ. (Obviously one can assume without any restriction that δ from
assumptions A2′(ii) and A2′(iii) is monotone increasing.)
Moreover, for τ ∈ [tσ
k,tσ
k + θ] we estimate
|˜ vσ
2(τ) − ˆ v2[t,∞,x∗




k)](τ) − ˆ v2[t,∞,x∗
2(t);y∗(t)](τ)|









k + ρθ − τ
￿￿











23In fact, according to A2′(iii) the same estimate holds for the sum of the above estimated diﬀerence
and |˜ xσ




2(t,τ)| = |e2(τ, ˜ vσ
2(τ), ˜ xσ
2(τ)) − e2(τ, ˆ v2[t,∞,x∗
2(t);y∗(t)](τ), ˆ x2[t,∞,x∗
2(t);y∗(t)](τ))|











where l is the Lipschitz constant of e2. Hence for t ∈ [tσ
k,tσ
k+1] we obtain successively
|vσ
1(t) − v∗




















































where γ = min{1,ρ − 1} and C2 is independent of σ.
Denoting by λ the Lipschitz constant of the overall right-side in (17), (18) with respect to (vi,xi,y)



































for every k ≥ 0.
Then from the estimations for |vσ
i (t) − v∗
i (t)| obtained above we conclude that for every ﬁnite
interval [0,T] one can estimate
|vσ
i (t) − v∗








with ¯ CT independent of σ. Hence vσ
i → v∗
i in C(0,∞) when h → 0, θ → +∞, which implies the
claim of the proposition.
Appendix 2: Discussion of the assumptions
Below we provide a certain justiﬁcation in the case of the global warming model of the assumptions
made in sections 3 and 4, focusing on the more requiring assumptions A1′ and A2′.
24The critical part of assumption A1′ is the (uniform in t) Lipschitz continuity in the set X × X ×
Y , combined with the invariance of this set with respect to the respective diﬀerential equations.
Theoretically, due to purely physical arguments, the productivity function p(t) must be bounded.
Hence, according to (2) the capital stock is bounded, therefore the emission is also bounded (since
the emission rate e(t) is also bounded). From the stability of the atmospheric system (3), (4) the
environmental states are also bounded. Hence, the sets X, Y , and E can be speciﬁed as bounded
sets. Thus the only trouble for the Lipschitz continuity is caused by the unboundedness of our
speciﬁcation for c(a) when a → 1. However, this trouble is artiﬁcial – the speciﬁcation for c(a) is
actually relevant only for values of a far below a = 1. Thus assumption A1′ is easily justiﬁable for
the global warming model.
The justiﬁcation of A2′ is much more complicated, since it involves the (unknown) optimal controls
ˆ v1 and ˆ v2. In general, even the uniqueness assumption A2′(i) is problematic in the Nordhause type
models, as it is shown in [10]. Namely, in the version of the DICE model considered in [10] the
authors show existence of a threshold manifold in the economic-environment state space, starting
at which the optimal policy is not unique: one leads to “lower warming”, a second one – to a
“higher warming”. However, in that paper the abatement is not used as a control, rather just
an exogenous parameter (there are also other small diﬀerences in the our model and the one in
[10]). Multiple solutions appear only in the case of a low value of the abatement parameter. Most
probably the non-uniqueness disappears when the abatement is used as a second control variable,
since the numerical experiments clearly shown uniqueness for the calibration of the model described
in Section 5.
Assumption A2′(iii) is not diﬃcult to check, since ˆ v2 is the optimal investment control (the abate-
ment control a obviously equals identically zero) in a version of the Ramsey model with a non-
stationary but bounded parameter.
Assumption A2′(ii) is diﬃcult for strict veriﬁcation. Its claim concerning the dependence of ˆ v1 on θ
is an well-know property, but general suﬃcient conditions for this property are, to our knowledge,
not available in the literature. However, it is clear that this property relies on a certain dissipativity,
and such is present in our model in a reasonable domain X × Y .
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